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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Petitioner, Mr. Zupon, filed this petition for review of
the Commission's August 3, 1992, Order affirming the Administrative
Law Judge's February 6, 1992, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and Order, both of which orders denied Mr. Zupon's application for
permanent total disability benefits.
Corporation

("Kaiser"),

Uninsured

Respondents Kaiser Steel
Employer's

Fund

("UEF"),

Employer's Reinsurance Fund ("ERF") and Industrial Commission of
("Commission")

Utah

(collectively

referred

to

herein

as

"Respondents") agree with the statutory bases for jurisdiction
cited in Mr. Zupon's brief.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The Respondents agree that this appeal presents the issue of
whether the Commission applied the proper standard of proof. The
second two issues listed by Petitioner, whether the Commission
ignored a prior finding and improperly failed to award permanent
total disability compensation, are really just a request that the
Court

of

Appeals

re-weigh

the

evidence

considered

by

the

Administrative Law Judge.
Accordingly, the standard of appellate review to be applied to
the first issue is that of correction of error.

Utah Code Ann.

S63-46b-16(4)(d); King v. Industrial Commission 209 Utah Adv. Rep.
33, 34 (Utah App. March 18, 1993). The remaining issues call into
question the Commission's

factual findings.

Accordingly, the

proper standard of appellate review for those issues is whether the
Commission's findings are "supported by substantial evidence when
viewed in light of the whole record before the court."

Utah Code

Ann. S63-46b-16(4)(g); King v. Industrial Commission, 209 Utah Adv.
Rep. at 34. *

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
With

the

exception

of

the

provisions

of

the

Utah

Administrative Procedures Act cited above, Respondents agree that
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-67 is the determinative statute in this case.
Mr. Zupon also raises in the body of his brief the limitations
provision in Utah Code Ann. §35-1-66. A copy of that Section as it
existed at the time of the accident is attached to this Brief as
Exhibit

"A."

In 1975, there was no statute of limitations

applicable to permanent total disability claims.

Cf. Utah Code

Ann. §35-1-98(2) (1990 amendment setting limitations period for
compensation claims).

Although not raised as an issue in the Docketing
Statement (Record, p. 59) or in the Statement of Issues in the
Brief (Brief, p. 1), Mr. Zupon also questions the adequacy of the
Commission's detailed Findings of Fact (Brief 11). The adequacy of
the findings themselves is a legal determination for this Court,
Adams v. Board of Review, 821 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1991).
The
Respondents will demonstrate the adequacy of those findings.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is an appeal of a denial of Mr. Zupon's May 24, 1991,
application

for

compensation

for

permanent

total

disability

allegedly caused by an industrial injury which occurred on August
7, 1975.

Course of Proceedings
Shortly following Mr. Zupon's August 7, 1975 accident he filed
an application for hearing alleging entitlement to temporary total
and permanent partial disability compensation.
1977,

an

Administrative

Law

Judge

issued

On February 10,

Findings

of

Fact,

Conclusions of Law and Order finding Mr. Zupon entitled to 25 and
4/7 weeks of temporary total compensation benefits and 31.2 weeks
of permanent partial disability compensation benefits (Record, pp.
90-92).
Nearly 16 years later, on May 24, 1991, Mr. Zupon filed an
application for permanent total disability benefits as a result of
his 1975 accident (Record, p. 1). Kaiser and the UEF answered the
application for hearing and moved to join the ERF as a respondent
(Record, pp. 3-5). After all parties had executed a stipulation
apportioning
Defendants

liability

for

any

potential

benefits

between

(Record, pp. 18-20), a formal hearing was held on

February 6, 1992 (Record, p. 21).
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Agency Disposition
On March 18, 1992, the Administrative Law Judge entered her
detailed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order concluding
that Mr. Zupon failed to sustain his burden of establishing that
his accident was the medical cause of his disability.

The ALJ

therefore denied the claim for permanent total disability benefits
(Record, pp. 21-30, copy attached as Exhibit "B" to Mr. Zupon's
brief).
Mr.

Zupon filed a Motion for Review with the Commission

assigning five points of error (Record, pp. 32-34).

When no

supporting memorandum was filed, the ALJ clarified her ruling and
responded to each point (Record, pp. 38-39).

Mr. Zupon belatedly

filed a "Reply Memorandum in Response to Administrative Law Judge's
Comments

In Re Motion for Review"

(Record, pp. 40-45).

The

Commission then entered its August 3, 1992, Order Denying Motion
for Review

separately

addressing

each of Mr. Zupon's points

(Record, pp. 46-50, copy attached as Exhibit "C" to Mr. Zupon's
brief).

The Commission's action is the subject of Mr. Zupon's

Petition for Review.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Mr. Zupon strained his back in an industrial accident at
Kaiser on August 7, 1975 (Record, pp. 22, 83).

No party has

contested either the event of the accident or how it occurred.

He

was promptly, but conservatively, treated by Dr. Smoot at Carbon
-4-

Medical Services Association (Record, pp. 23, 100-110). Mr. Zupon
was subsequently seen by Dr. Chapman who first suggested a 50% loss
of body function due to the accident; Dr. Chapman later retrenched
and acknowledged he should not assign a disability rating, and he
ultimately concluded "It is my opinion that this man is permanently
disabled for his regular occupation in the coal mine by nature of
his progressive generalized arthritis" (Record, p. 226).
A

hearing

on

Mr.

Zupon's

claim

for

permanent

partial

disability benefits was held on August 23, 1976, and his case was
referred to a medical panel.
November

That panel issued its report on

24, 1976, finding that Mr. Zupon's

"total physical

impairment resulting from all causes and conditions, including the
industrial injury, but excluding the eye, is 60%" (Record, p. 89).
The panel attributed a 10% permanent physical impairment to the
industrial injury "on the basis that there is a one-in-six chance
that the ankylosingspondylitis was aggravated by the lumbar back
strain" (Record, p. 89).

The panel also found that no future

medical treatment for the industrial injury would be necessary.
Notwithstanding the patently speculative nature of the panel's
finding, but in the absence of any objection by the parties, the
ALJ

entered

his order adopting

the medical panel's

findings

(Record, pp. 90-92). The compensation ordered by the ALJ was paid
by Kaiser (Record, p. 19).
2

Mr. Zupon had lost the sight of his left eye twenty years
before (Record, p. 88).
-5-

Nearly

contemporaneously

with

the

medical

panel's

deliberations, Mr. Zupon saw Dr. McArthur whose impressions were
"Residuals of a back strain.

I do not believe this man has

sufficient enough back pain to keep him from working" (Record,
p. 225).
While Mr. Zupon's application for permanent partial disability
compensation was pending with the Commission, he initiated a claim
for Social Security disability benefits.

His initial claim was

filed October 7, 1975 (Record, pp. 23, 239). That application was
denied, the claim was denied again on reconsideration, and the
denial was affirmed by the appeals counsel on January 18, 1977.
(Record, p. 240). A supplemental hearing was conducted on May 31,
1978, resulting in a detailed decision based upon medical reports
and a vocational expert (Record, pp. 240-244).

Noting that Mr.

Zupon had suffered a "back strain" as a result of his 1975
industrial accident, the Social Security ALJ found that level of
impairment did not preclude him from working.

After summarizing

the uncontroverted evidence of a progressive arthritic condition,
the ALJ stated:
The administrative law judge is impressed with the
sincerity of the claimant when he testified that
beginning in January 1977 he lost the dexterity in his
hands. Until that time the claimant is not deemed to
have been disabled but considering the credibility of the
claimant's testimony as to the effect of arthritis in his
hands and fingers together with his other impairments, it
is found that the claimant became disabled January 1,
1977, which disability has been continuing.
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(Record, p. 244)

Social Security benefits were then awarded.3

There are no medical records indicating any progression or
deterioration of Mr. Zupon's condition.

Indeed, there is no

evidence of any back treatment after 1977. The only medical record
relating to Mr. Zupon*s back from the period between the 1978
Social

Security Administration

hearing and the present

is a

December 9, 1981 medical evaluation by Clyde Bench, M.D. Dr. Bench
concluded his final December 8, 1981, report with a series of
findings relating to degenerative arthritis and concluded "I think
this patient's symptoms are way out of proportion to the objective
findings which are presented" (Record, pp. 26, 249).

Dr. Bench

offered no opinion that Mr. Zupon1s remaining conditions were due
to the industrial accident.
In 1991, Mr. Zupon filed his new claim for permanent total
disability benefits alleging that, at age 67, he was now unable to
work as a result of his August 7, 1975, industrial injury.

His

claim was denied by the ALJ (Record, pp. 21-30), and that denial
was affirmed by the Commission (Record, pp. 46-50).

Between his

accident and the time of hearing, he had been awarded temporary
total and permanent partial disability benefits from the Industrial
Commission, Union Disability benefits, Social Security benefits,

Notably, Dr. M.B. Jensen who examined Mr. Zupon on March
24, 1977, apparently in connection with his Social Security claim,
did not even mention an industrial accident in his medical
evaluation (Record, pp. 96-97). None of his diagnoses implicated
any industrial cause.

-7-

non-service connected VA disability benefits and federal Black Lung
total disability benefits (Record, pp. 4, 27).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Commission properly found that Mr. Zupon failed to carry
his affirmative burden of proof of establishing by a preponderance
of the evidence that his industrial injury was the medical cause of
his disability.

Contrary to his argument, the "liberal policy"

behind the Worker's Compensation laws is not a substitute for this
burden of proof.
There

is no affirmative medical

evidence that

the 1975

accident rendered the applicant permanent totally disabled.

He

never underwent surgery for his back and obtained no impairment
rating beyond what was already paid by Kaiser. The record contains
no medical evidence indicating any new development since the
Commission's earlier award, with the exceptions of the Social
Security Administration records (which document a disability caused
instead by a loss of dexterity in his hands) and Dr. Bench's
assessment

that his symptoms

are out of proportion with the

objective findings.
The ALJ carefully and comprehensively analyzed this largely
uncontradicted

evidence.

Her

denial

of

benefits,

and

the

Commission's order affirming that denial, are amply supported by
substantial evidence and should be affirmed.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE COMMISSION APPLIED THE CORRECT BURDEN OF PROOF,

The ALJ found, on two alternative bases, that Mr. Zupon failed
to sustain his burden of establishing medical causation (Record,
pp.

27-29).

In denying Mr. Zupon's motion

for review, the

Commission found that ALJ had properly required proof of causation
by preponderance of the evidence (Record, p. 46). The findings of
both the ALJ and the Commission are appropriate and should be
affirmed.
The Utah courts have consistently required proof of a causal
connection between the injury and the employment.
Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15, 22 (Utah 1986).
Supreme Court adopted a two-part test for causation.

Allen v.

In Allen, the
In order to

identify compensable injuries, consideration must first be given to
the legal cause of the injury and then to its medical cause, which
is to prove that "the disability is medically the result of an
exertion or injury that occurred during a work-related activity."
Id. at 27.

Proof of medical causation is required, according to

the court, to prevent the employer from becoming "a general insurer
of his employees." Thus, it remains the claimant's burden to show
that "the stress, strain, or exertion required by his or her
occupation led to the resulting injury or disability. In the event
the claimant cannot show a medical causal connection, compensation
should be denied."

Id. at 27.

-9-

The Allen holding was followed by this Court in the case of
Large v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 758 P.2d 954 (Utah App.
1988).

In Large, a truck driver suffered a lower back injury while

applying for a job.

Much like the present case, he received an

initial award of temporary total disability benefits which was not
appealed.

Some time later, he filed an application alleging

entitlement to permanent total disability benefits because 5% of
his impairment was due to the 1985 accident. This Court rehearsed
the legal/medical causes tests under Allen and noted that the
standard of proof for causation is that of a preponderance of the
evidence.
prior

Jd. at 956.

back

problems,

In light of the applicant's history of
including

surgeries,

the

court

found

substantial evidence to support the Commission's finding that the
1985 injury with its 5% additional impairment was not the medical
cause of permanent total disability.

Ld. at 957. These standards

were expressly followed by both the ALJ and the Commission in the
present case.
Mr. Zupon makes two arguments to suggest that the Commission
should have applied a different burden of proof.
that

the

"liberal

construction"

required

of

He first argues
the

Worker's

Compensation Act is somehow a substitute for his burden of proof.
Then, he argues that the burden of proof is not his, but rather
that it rests with the employer to find a line of employment that
the employee can do.

Both arguments fail.
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Mr. Zupon argues that all doubts, no matter how remote, must
be resolved in favor of an award of compensation and that it is
error if the judge's "liberal construction" is not obvious from the
face of the order (Brief pp. 5-7).
beneficial
acknowledged

policies

of

the

While the well-recognized

Worker's

Compensation

by the Respondents, the argument

that

Act

are

even the

slightest question of fact requires an award of benefits greatly
distorts the policies of the law. His argument, if adopted, would
effectively result in a presumption of entitlement to benefits.
Employers would then have the burden in each case of rebutting the
presumption.

Such a presumption has never been a part of Utah

Workers' Compensation law.
As noted above, the Utah courts have held that the burden
remains with the applicant to establish his entitlement to benefits
by a preponderance of the evidence.

Benefits are to be awarded

based upon evidence, not speculation.

In Kaiser Steel Corp. v.

Industrial Commission, 709 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1985), a case cited by
Mr. Zupon, Chief Justice Hall observed:
"The acknowledged purpose of the Worker's Compensation
Act is to compensate for the incapacities attributable to
industrial injuries. However, it is not the purpose of
the Act to provide a general health insurance plan
covering and providing for compensation for any and all
preexisting incapacities an employee may suffer from, and
this Court has never so indicated."
709 P.2d at 1172 (Hall, J., dissenting, emphasis by the Court,
citation omitted).
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Mr. Zupon's theory that this policy requires an award of
benefits

regardless

of

how

the

evidence

preponderates

would

effectively remove the element of proof and make of the Worker's
Compensation program a general health insurance plan.

Even the

most "liberal" construction of the law cannot require this result.
Rather, those cases cited by Mr. Zupon must be read to apply to
substantial doubts raised by equally probative but contradictory
evidence. Even in such cases, care must be taken not to ignore the
requirements that the evidence preponderate in the applicant's
favor before an award of benefits is made.
Caution

must

also

be

exercised

in

applying

a

"liberal

construction" to make sure that the rights of all parties are
safeguarded, not just those of the injured worker.

The United

States Supreme Court, in a case involving the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (the "LHWCA"), has discussed the
balance struck in Workers' Compensation legislation:
Implicit in [respondents'] argument, however, is the
assumption that the sole purpose of the Act was to
provide disabled workers with a complete remedy for their
industrial injuries. The inaccuracy of this implicit
assumption undercuts the validity of respondents'
argument.
The LHWCA, like other workmen's compensation
legislation, is indeed remedial in that it was intended
to provide a certain recovery for employees who are
injured on the job. It imposes liability without fault
and precludes the assertion of various common-law
defenses that had frequently resulted in the denial of
any recovery for disabled laborers. While providing
employees with the benefit of a more certain recovery for
work-related harms, statutes of this kind to not purport
to provide complete compensation for the wage earner's
-12-

economic loss. . . . [L]ike most workmen's compensation
legislation, the LHWCA represents a compromise between
the competing interests of disabled laborers and their
employers.
Potomac Electric Power Company v. Director, OWCP, 449 U.S. 268,
282-283 (1980).

The Utah Workers' Compensation Act also reflects

such a compromise.
Nevertheless, the Administrative Law Judge did afford Mr.
Zupon the "extreme benefit of the doubt" in the present case
(Record, p. 29). Expressing her skepticism about the speculative
"one-in-six chance" basis for the 10% whole person impairment
previously

adopted

to support

Mr. Zupon's

permanent

partial

disability award, she analyzed the evidence on that basis and still
found the required proof of causation lacking.
Similarly, the applicant's reliance on Marshall v. Industrial
Commission 704 P.2d 581 (Utah 1985) is misplaced.
place,

that

case

("Marshall

II") treats

In the first

the subject

of an

applicant's entitlement to interest on an award of benefits. Mr.
Zupon apparently meant to cite Marshall v. Industrial Commission,
681 P.2d 208 (1984), ("Marshall I"), in which the Supreme Court
formally adopted the "odd lot doctrine."

Under Marshall I, the

burden shifts to the employer in such cases to show that regular
work is available, but only after the employee has demonstrated
that his work-related impairment prevents him from performing his
former work and that he cannot be rehabilitated.

Id. at 212-213;

Ortiz v. Industrial Commission, 766 P.2d 1092, 1094 (UtahApp. 1989).
-13-

Marshall I does not excuse an applicant's failure to prove
that his disability is work-related, and it implicitly contemplates
that an application for hearing will be filed in a timely fashion
so that the questions of rehabilitation and available work can be
addressed

while

motivated

and

demonstrated

the evidence

of employment
below,

Mr.

is

fresh and

age.

Zupon

did

the applicant

is

In the present

case, as

not

that

demonstrate

disability was caused by his industrial accident.

his

Moreover, his

16-year delay in claiming permanent total disability benefits would
work to the extreme prejudice of Respondents, should the odd lot
doctrine be applied.4

At least where the delay is responsibility

of the applicant for benefits, and was not contributed to in any
meaningful way by the Respondents, any shifting of the burden of
proof would be grossly prejudicial and unfair to Respondents.

II.

THE COMMISSION'S DENIAL OF BENEFITS AS SUPPORTED BY
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.

The ALJ exhaustively reviewed the evidence in this claim and
found that Mr. Zupon had not met his burden of proof. Accordingly,
permanent total disability benefits were denied.

The ALJ later

clarified her findings in a separate letter filed in response to
4

Indeed, in this case, the applicant has conceded that the
employer (the party to whom the burden shifts under the odd lot
analysis) satisfied all its obligations to the applicant (Record,
pp. 18, 19). Mr. Zupon's burden-shifting argument becomes even
more inapposite when the impact of his suggested burden falls
sixteen years later on the various state funds that are called upon
to supplement and/or continue payments of benefits.
-14-

Mr. Zupon's unsupported Motion for Review (Record, pp. 38, 39).
After the Motion was supplemented with a "Reply Memorandum" the
full Commission considered the Motion for Review and entered its
Order Denying Motion for Review (Record, pp. 46-50).
Mr. Zupon, in the second and third issues presented on appeal
(Brief, p. 1) essentially asks the Court of Appeals to reweigh the
evidence and decide the case differently.

In Merriam v. Board of

Review, 812 P.2d 447 (Utah App. 1991), this Court restated its rule
that, under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, findings of
fact will

be affirmed

if they are supported

by

substantial

evidence.

Reaffirming that it remains the appellant's burden to

martial the evidence to show that the findings are not supported by
substantial evidence, and citing Allen for the proposition that a
claimant must prove the alleged disability was medically caused by
work-related activity, the Court acknowledged that "if a claimant
cannot demonstrate a medical causal connection, compensation should
be denied.

Medical causation is a factual matter."

Id. at 450

(citations omitted).
This standard of review is consistent with this Court's recent
comprehensive

discussion

of standard

of review applicable to

Industrial Commission appeals in King v. Industrial Commission, 209
Utah Adv. Rep. 33 App. (Utah March 18, 1993) (factual findings are
reviewed under substantial evidence standard; interpretations of
law reviewed under a correction of error standard).

The factual

findings entered by the Administrative Law Judge and by the
-15-

Commission

in this case all enjoy the support of substantial

evidence.
Mr. Zupon attempts once again to twist the burden of proof by
arguing in the double negative:

"There was no evidence presented

which indicated in any way the Mr. Zupon's inability to work was
related to his asymptomatic degenerative arthritis. . ." (Brief,
p. 10).

Even though there was ample evidence of that fact, he

ignores the conclusion his argument dictates: the lack of evidence
means he failed to meet his burden of proof.
Mr. Zupon then criticizes the Findings of Fact entered by the
ALJ as "grossly inadequate," citing Adams v. Board of Review, 821
P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1991).

Her findings are not susceptible to that

criticism. The ALJ discussed the evidence at length in her 10 page
opinion (Record, pp. 21-30).

She made findings as to how the

accident occurred and traced in meticulous detail the course of Mr.
Zuponfs medical treatment.

Her task was made easier by the fact

that there was little or no contradiction in the medical evidence.
Importantly, all of the medical evidence in the record was offered
by Mr. Zupon in Exhibits "A" to "M" (Record, pp. 83-258).

The

Respondents offered no medical documents. Thus, Mr. Zupon1s burden
on appeal is to martial his own medical evidence to show that the
findings are inadequate, as he provided no transcript against which
to evaluate his contentions.

King v. Industrial Commission, 209

Utah Adv. Rep. at 34. He has not met this burden.
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Although the ALJ did not make her findings in separately
numbered paragraphs# nevertheless, they explicitly reveal the steps
Adams v. Board of Review# 821

she took in reaching her decision.
P.2d at 5.

Having described the accident (Record, p. 22) the ALJ

noted Mr. Zupon's complaints of pain "all over" and that he applied
for Social Security disability benefits after asking Dr. Smoot
about being "totalled out" (Record, p. 23). She traced Mr. Zupon's
treatment by Dr. Chapman who initially suggested the 50% loss of
body function, but then declined to issue a disability rating. In
particular, she acknowledged Dr. Chapman's conclusion that "the
applicant was permanently disabled for his regular occupation in
the coal mine due to progressive generalized arthritis" (Record,
pp. 23-24, emphasis added).

She then discussed the medical panel

findings and Dr. McArthur's concurrent finding that the applicant
did not have sufficient pain from his acute lumbar strain to keep
him from working.

She juxtaposed that finding with the medical

panel's 10% impairment rating based on a "one-in-six chance that
his preexisting problems were aggravated by the lumbar back strain"
(Record, p. 25). Finally, she made findings relating to the denial
of Social Security benefits and a later award of those benefits
based upon the progression of arthritis in the applicant's hands
and fingers (Record, pp. 25-26).
Based
conclusions

upon
about

these
Mr.

findings,
Zupon's

the

failure

ALJ
to

made

alternative

establish

medical

causation, either of which will support the denial of benefits.
-17-

First, she found that the cause of his inability to work was the
arthritic condition in his hands and fingers based upon the "very
relevant

and

convincing"

findings

of

the

Social

Administration entered into evidence by Mr. Zupon.

Security

She did not

rely solely upon those findings, however, because she correlated
them with the other medical records (Record, pp. 27-28).

Second,

although she had "real questions" about the prior ALJ's adoption of
the medical panel's 10% impairment based upon a one-in-six chance
of aggravation, she expressed her willingness to give the applicant
the "extreme" benefit of the doubt in that regard and still found
his proof lacking.

In light of the consistent other medical

evidence and the apparent lack of any new development with his back
after 1976, she found the claimant failed to carry his burden of
establishing that the industrial injury caused his total disability
(Record, pp. 28-29).5
These findings were noted and highlighted by the Commission in
its Order Denying Motion for Review (Record, pp. 46-51).

The

Commission briefly discussed the pertinent medical evidence and,
like the ALJ, found that Mr. Zupon failed to carry his burden of
establishing medical causation. Accordingly, benefits were denied.
5

Mr. Zupon criticizes the ALJ for ignoring the prior 10%
impairment award (Brief, pp. 10-11). In fact, she addressed that
award several times and made an alternative finding based upon it.
Notwithstanding the Commission's continuing jurisdiction to modify
such an award under Utah Code Ann. §35-1-78, she did not alter the
prior order. Nor did Mr. Zupon demonstrate any significant change
or new development since the earlier order that would justify a
modification in his favor.
-18-

The Commission's findings, though more brief than those of the ALJ,
are clear, consistent, and are supported by substantial evidence.
This case is very similar to Hodges v. Western Piling &
Sheeting Co., 717 P.2d

(Utah 1986).

718

In that case, the

petitioner had an accident which resulted in a flair-up of his
arthritic condition.

A medical panel found the petitioner had a

significant impairment due to arthritis and other causes and a 9%
to 12% permanent loss of body function due to the industrial
injury.

The Supreme Court noted that there was substantial

evidence to support the Commission's determination that the injury
did not result in permanent and total disability.

The case was

then remanded solely to resolve some mathematical inconsistencies
in the medical panel's findings.
In the present

case, Mr. Zupon sustained

an industrial

accident. His injury was rated and paid. He accepted that payment
without appeal.

Some sixteen years later, with absolutely no

medical evidence of any change or deterioration in that condition,
he

now

asks

for

an

award

of

permanent

total

disability

compensation. The Commission properly found that Mr. Zupon did not
prove that his disability was medically caused by his accident and
therefore denied his claim.

That finding should be affirmed.

-19-

III.

MR, ZUPON IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF PERMANENT
PARTIAL DISABILITY COMPENSATION.

In his memorandum supporting the motion for review with the
Industrial Commission, the applicant for the first time asked for
an award of additional permanent partial disability compensation
(Record, pp. 43-44).

That request was denied by the Commission

because the applicant had never requested consideration of such a
claim and it was therefore barred by the then-applicable eight year
statute of limitations.

Utah Code Ann. S35-1-66 (Exhibit "A" to

this brief).
On appeal, Mr. Zupon again raises this question though he
attempts to cloak it under the title of permanent total disability
compensation (Brief pp. 13-14).
compensated

for

the

His argument is that he was never

preexisting

component

of

his

industrial

accident and that the Commission could not bar his request on the
basis

of

the

statute

of

limitations

because

that

was

"an

affirmative defense and was never raised by the employer or the
uninsured employer's fund at the hearing level" (Brief at 14). Mr.
Zupon's argument fails on several obvious bases.
No affirmative defense was raised by Kaiser or the UEF at
hearing because those parties had been excused pursuant to Mr.
Zupon's stipulation and in accordance with a letter from his
attorney (Record, pp. 17-20). Moreover, no party could have raised
the statute of limitations applicable to claims for permanent
partial disability benefits because Mr. Zupon did not raise that
-20-

claim as an issue at hearing (Record, p. 1). It was first raised
in his Reply Memorandum to the Commission, and was promptly
rejected by the Commission.
Finally,

it

is

clear

that

the

applicable

statute

of

limitations did run. After his accident, Mr. Zupon had eight years
within which to file a claim for permanent partial disability
compensation. Dean Evans Chrysler Plymouth v. Morse, 692 P.2d 779,
782

(Utah 1984).

He did so and received a 10% award.

No

additional application was filed within the eight-year period and
no grounds for modification have been demonstrated.
The Commission properly declined to amend additional permanent
partial disability compensation.6

CONCLUSION
The orders of the ALJ and the Commission applied proper legal
standards and their findings are amply supported by the medical
evidence in the record.

That evidence demonstrates Mr. Zupon

sustained an industrial accident in 1975 for which he was fully
compensated.

No medical evidence documents that the industrial

accident is the cause of total disability.

Instead, Mr. Zupon's

evidence demonstrates that his disability is due to other causes.

Even if the current statute of limitations were deemed
applicable because of the date of the application for hearing, the
claim would be barred because it was not filed within six years
from the date of the accident. Utah Code Ann. §35-1-98.
-21-

The Commission's Order Denying Motion for Review should be
affirmed by this Court.
DATED this 15th day of April, 1993.
CLYDE, PRATT & SNOW, P.C.

,fe«»—

, •>

Edwin C. Barnes, Esq.
Attorney for Kaiser Steel Corporation
and the Uninsured Employers' Fund

Sims, Esq.
or the Industrial
'ssion of Utah

Attorney for the Employers'
Reinsurance Fund
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on April 15, 1993, four copies of the
foregoing JOINT BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS were mailed U.S. first class
mail, postage prepaid to the following:
Virginius Dabney, Esq.
DABNEY & DABNEY, P.C.
350 South 400 East, Suite 202
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Petitioner
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Tab A

causes partial disability for work, the employee shall receive, during such
disability for not to exceed 312 weeks over a period of not to exceed eight
years from the date of the injury, compensation equal to 66%% of the
difference between his average weekly wages before the accident and the
weekly wages he is able to earn thereafter, but not more than a maximum
of 66%% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury
per week and in addition thereto $5 for a dependent wife and $5 for each
dependent minor child under the age of eighteen years, up to a maximum of
four such dependent minor children, but not to exceed 66%% of the
state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week.
The commission may make a permanent partial disability award at any
time prior to eight years after the date of injury to any employee whose
physical condition resulting from such injury is not finally healed and
fixed eight years after the date of injury and who files an application for
such purpose prior to the expiration of such eight-year period.
In case the partial disability begins after a period of total disability,
the period of total disability shall be deducted from the total period of
compensation.
In no case shall the weekly payments continue after the disability ends,
or the death of the injured person.
In the case of the following injuries the compensation shall be 66%%
of his average weekly wages at the time of the injury, but not more than a
maximum of 66%% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the
injury per week and not less than a minimum of $35 per week plus $5 for
a dependent wife and $5 for each dependent minor child under the age of
18 years; up to a maximum of four such dependent minor children, but not
to exceed 66%% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the
injury per week, to be paid weekly for the number of weeks stated against
such injuries respectively, and shall be in addition to the compensation
hereinbefore provided for temporary total disability, to wit:
For the loss of:
Number of "Weeks
(A) Upper extremity
(1) Arm
(a) Arm and shoulder (forequarter amputation)
218
(b) Arm at shoulder joint, or above deltoid insertion
187
(c) Arm between deltoid insertion and elbow joint, at elbow
joint, or below elbow joint proximal to insertion of
biceps tendon
178
(d) Forearm below elbow joint distal to insertion of biceps
tendon
168
(2) Hand
(a) At wrist or midcarpal or midmetacarpal amputation
168
(b) All fingers except thumb at metacarpophalangeal joints
101
(3) Thumb
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with resection of carpometacarpal bone
™
67
(b) At interphalangeal joint
50
(4) Index finger
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with resection of metacarpal bone
42
(b) At proximal interphalangeal joint
34
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint
18
(5) Middle finger
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with resection of metacarpal bone
34
(b) At proximal interphalangeal joint
27
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint
15
(6) Ring finger
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with resection of metacarpal bone
17
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(b) At proximal interphalangeal joint
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint
(7) Little finger
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with resection of metacarpal bone
.
(b) At proximal interphalangeal joint
.
.
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint
(B) Lower extremity
(1) Leg
(a) Hemipelvectomy (leg, hip and pelvis)
(b) Leg at hip joint or three inches or less below tuberosity
of ischium
(c) Leg above knee with functional stump, at knee joint or
Gritti-Stokes amputation or below knee with short stump
(three inches or less below intercondylar notch)
(d) Leg below knee with functional stump
(2) Foot
(a) Foot at ankle
(b) Foot partial amputation (Chopart's)
(c) Foot midmetatarsal amputation
(3)

3D-1-00

13
8
8
6
4

156
125
112
88
88
66
44

Toes

(a)

Great toe
(i) With resection of metatarsal bone
(ii) At metatarsophalangeal joint
(iii) At interphalangeal joint
(b) Lesser toe (2nd—5th)
(i) With resection of metatarsal bone
(ii) At metatarsophalangeal joint
(iii) At proximal interphalangeal joint
(iv) At distal interphalangeal joint
(c) All toes at metatarsophalangeal joints
(4) Miscellaneous
(a) One eye by enucleation
(b) Total blindness of one eye
(c) Total loss of binaural hearing

26
16
12
4
3
2
1
26
120
100
100

(C) Permanent and complete loss of use shall be deemed equivalent to
loss of the member. Partial loss or partial loss of use shall be a percentage
of the complete loss or loss of use of the member. This paragraph, however, shall not apply to the items listed in (B) (4).
Permanent hearing loss caused by accident shall be determined and paid
as follows:
"Loss of hearing" is defined as the binaural hearing loss measured in
decibels with frequencies of 500, 1000 and 2000 cycles per second (cps) using pure tone air conduction audiometric instruments (ASA 1951) approved
by nationally recognized authorities in the field of measurement of hearing
impairment. Reduction of hearing ability in frequencies above 2000 cycles
per second shall not be considered in determining compensable disability.
"Presbycusis" is defined as hearing loss common to persons of advanced
age and is considered to be due to general environment rather than industrial conditions.
In measuring hearing loss, a medical panel of medical and paramedical
professions appointed by the commission shall measure the loss in each ear
at the three frequencies 500,1000 and 2000 cycles per second which shall be
added together and divided by three to determine the average decibel loss.
To allow for presbycusis, there shall be deducted from the average decibel
loss Y2 a decibel for each year of the employee's age over forty at the time
of the accident: To determine the percentage of hearing loss in each ear,
(after deduction of the loss in decibels for presbycusis) the average decibel
loss for each decibel of loss exceeding fifteen decibels shall be multiplied by

Binaural hearing loss is determined by multiplying the percentage of
hearing loss in the better ear by five, then adding the percentage of hearing loss in the poorer ear and dividing by six. The resulting figure is the
percentage of binaural hearing loss. Compensation for permanent partial
disability for binaural hearing loss shall be determined by multiplying the
percentage of binaural hearing loss by 100 weeks of compensation benefits
as provided in this chapter. Where an employee files one or more claims
for hearing loss the percentage of hearing loss previously found to exist
shall be deducted from any subsequent award by the commission. In no
event shall compensation benefits be paid for total or 100% binaural hearing loss exceeding 100 weeks of compensation benefits.
For any other disfigurement or the loss of bodily function not otherwise
provided for herein, such period of compensation as the commission shall
deem equitable and in proportion as near as may be to compensation for
specific loss as set forth in the schedule in this section but not exceeding in
any case 312 weeks, which shall be considered the period of compensation
for permanent total loss of bodily function.
The amounts specified in this section are all subject to the limitations
as to the maximum weekly amount payable as specified in this section, and
in no event shall more than a maximum of 66%% of the state average
weekly wage at the time of the injury for a total of 312 weeks in compensation be required to be paid.

